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Abstract. Security assessment tasks and intrusion detection systems do
rely on automated fingerprinting of devices and services. Most current
fingerprinting approaches use a signature matching scheme, where a set
of signatures are compared with traffic issued by an unknown entity. The
entity is identified by finding the closest match with the stored signatures.
These fingerprinting signatures are found mostly manually, requiring a
laborious activity and needing advanced domain specific expertise. In
this paper we describe a novel approach to automate this process and
build flexible and efficient fingerprinting systems able to identify the
source entity of messages in the network. We follow a passive approach
without need to interact with the tested device. Application level traf-
fic is captured passively and inherent structural features are used for
the classification process. We describe and assess a new technique for
the automated extraction of protocol fingerprints based on arborescent
features extracted from the underlying grammar. We have successfully
applied our technique to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used in
Voice over IP signalling.
Key words: Passive Fingerprinting, Feature extraction, Structural syn-
tax inference
1 Introduction
Many security operations rely on the precise identification of a remote device
or a subset of it (e.g. network protocol stacks, services). In security assessment
tasks, this fingerprinting step is essential for evaluating the security of a remote
and unknown system; especially network intrusion detection systems might use
this knowledge to detect rogue systems and stealth intruders. Another important
applicability resides in blackbox devices/application testing for potential copy-
right infringements. In the latter case, when no access to source code is provided,
the only hints that might detect a copyright infringement can be obtained by
observing the network level traces and determine if a given copyright protected
software/source code is used unlawfully.
The work described in this paper was motivated by one major challenge
that we had to face when building a Voice over IP (VoIP) specific intrusion
detection system. We had to fingerprint VoIP devices and stacks in order to
detect the presence of a rogue system on the network. Typically, only some
vendor specific devices should be able to connect, while others and potentially
malicious intended systems had to be detected and blocked. We decided that
an automated system, capable to self-tune and self-deploy was the only viable
solution on the long run. Therefore, we considered that the ideal system has to
be able to process captured and labeled network traffic and detect the structural
features that serve as potential differentiators. When searching for such potential
features, there are some natural candidates: the type of individual fields and
their length or the order in which they appear. For instance, the presence of
login headers, the quantities of spaces after commas or the order presented in the
handshake of capabilities. Most existing systems use such features, but individual
signatures are built manually requiring a tedious and time consuming process.
Our approach consists in an automated solution for this task, assuming a
known syntax specification of the protocol data units. We have considered only
the signalling traffic - all devices were using Session Initiation Protocol [1] (SIP)
- and our key contribution is to differentiate stack implementations by looking
at some specific patterns in how the message processing code has been designed
and developed. This is done in two main steps. In the first step, we extract fea-
tures that can serve to differentiate among several stack implementations. These
features are used in a second phase in order to implement a decisional process.
This approach and the supporting algorithms are presented in this paper.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 illustrates the overall architec-
ture and operational framework of our fingerprinting system. Section 3 shows
how structural inference, comparison and identification of differences can be
done based on the underlying grammar of a given specified protocol. Section
4 introduces the training, calibration and classification process. We provide an
overview of experimental results in Sect.5 using the signalling protocol (SIP) as
an application case. Section 6 describes the related work in the area of finger-
printing as well as the more general work on structural similarity. Finally, Sect.7
points out future works and concludes this paper.
2 Structural Protocol Fingerprinting
Most known application level and network protocols use a syntax specification
based on formal grammars. The essential issue is that each individual message
can be represented by a tree like structure. We have observed that stack imple-
menters can be tracked by some specific subtrees and/or collection of subtrees
appearing in the parse trees. The key idea is that structural differences between
two devices can be detected by comparing the underlying parse trees gener-
ated for several messages. A structural signature is given by features that are
extracted from these tree structures. Such distinctive features are called finger-
prints. We will address in the following the automated identification of them.
If we focus for the moment one individual productions (in a grammar rule),
the types of signatures might be given by:
– Different contents for one field. This is in fact a sequence of characters which
can determinate a signature. (e.g. a prompt or an initialization message).
– Different lengths for one field. The grammar allows the production of a
repetition of items (e.g. quantity of spaces after a symbol, capabilities sup-
ported). In this case, the length of the field is a good signature candidate.
– Different orders in one field. This is possible, when no explicit order is
specified in a set of items. A typical case is how capabilities are advertised
in current protocols.
We propose a learning method to automatically identify distinctive structural
signatures. This is done by analyzing and comparing captured messages traces
from the different devices. The overview of the learning and classification process
is illustrated in Fig.1.
Fig. 1. Fingerprinting training and classification
The upper boxes in Fig.1 constitute the training period of the system. The
output is a set of signatures for each device presented in the training set. The
lowest box represents the fingerprinting process. The training is divided in two
phases:
Phase 1 (Device Invariant Features). In this phase, the system automat-
ically classifies each field in the grammar. This classification is needed to
identify which fields may change between messages coming from the same
device.
Phase 2 (Inter Device Features Significance) identifies among the Invariant
fields of each implementation, those having different values for at least two
group of devices. These fields will constitute part of the signatures set.
When one message has to be classified, the values of each invariant field are
extracted and compared to the signature values learned in the training phase.
3 Structural Inference
3.1 Formal Grammars and Protocol Fingerprinting
The key assumption made in our approach is that an Augmented BackusNaur
Form (ABNF) grammar [2] specification is a priori known for a given protocol.
Such a specification is made of some basic elements as shown in Fig.2.
Fig. 2. Basic elements of a grammar
– A Terminal can represent a fixed string or a character to be chosen from a
range of legitimate characters.
– A Non-Terminal is reduced using some rules to either a Terminal or a
Non-Terminal.
– A Choice defines an arbitrary selection among several items.
– A Sequence involves a fixed number of items, where the order is specified.
– A Repetition involves a sequence of one item/group of items, where some
additional constraints might be specified.
A given message is parsed according to the fields defined in the grammar.
Each element of the grammar is placed in an n-ary tree which obeys the following
rules:
– A Terminal becomes a leaf node with a name associated (i.e. the termi-
nal that it represents) which is associated to the encountered value in the
message.
– A Non-Terminal is an internal node associated to a name (i.e. the non-
terminal rule) and it has a unique child which can be any of the types defined
here (e.g. Terminal, non-Terminal, Sequence or Repetition).
– A Sequence is an internal node that has a fixed number of children. This
number is in-line with the rules of the syntax specification.
– A Repetition is also an internal node, but having a number of children that
may vary based on the number of items which appear in the message.
– A Choice does not create any node in the tree. However, it just marks the
node that has been elected from a choice item.
It is important to note that even if sequences and repetitions do not have a
defined name in the grammar rules, an implicit name is assigned to them that
uniquely distinguishes each instance of these items at the current rule.
Figure 3 shows a Toy ABNF grammar defined in (a), messages from differ-
ent implementation compliant with the grammar in (b/c) and (d) the inferred
structure representing one of the messages in (d).
With respect to the usage, fields can be classified in three categories:
– Cosmetics Fields: these fields are mandatory and do not really provide a
value added interest for fingerprinting purposes. The associated values do
not change in different implementations.
– Static Fields: are the fields which values never change in a same implemen-
tation. These values do however change between different implementations.
Obviously, these are the type of fields which may represent a signature for
one implementation.
– Dynamic Fields: these fields are the opposite of static fields and do change
their values in relation to semantic aspects of the message even in a single
implementation.
An additional sub-classification can be defined for Dynamic and Static fields:
– Value Type relates to the String reduction of the node (i.e. the text infor-
mation of that node),
– Choice Type relates to the selected choice from the grammar,
– Length Type corresponds to the number of items in a Repetition reduction,
– Order Type corresponds to the order in which items of a Repetition re-
duction appear.
Even if one implementation may generate different kind of values for the same
field, such values could be related by a function and then serve as a feature.
Therefore, a Function Type can be also defined to be used to compute the
value from a node of the tree and return an output useful for the fingerprinting.
Essentially, this type is used for manually tuning the training process.
Fig. 3. Parsed Structure Grammar
3.2 Node Signatures and Resemblance
Guidelines for designing a set of tree signatures (for a tree or a sub-tree) should
follow some general common sense principles like:
– As more items are shared between trees, the more similar their signatures
must be.
– Nodes that have different tags or ancestors must be considered different.
– In cases where the parent node is a Sequence, the location order in the
Sequence should be part of the tree signature.
– If the parent node is a repetition, the location order should not be part of the
tree signature, order will be captured later on in the fingerprinting features.
The closest known approach is published by D. Buttler in [3]. This method
starts by encoding the tree in a set. Each element in the set represents a partial
path from the root to any of the nodes in the tree. A resemblance method
defined by A. Broder [4] uses the elements of the set as tokens. This resemblance
is based on shingles, where a shingle is a contiguous sequence of tokens from the
document. Between documents Di and Dj the resemblance is defined as:
r(Di, Dj) =
|S(Di, w)
∩
S(Dj , w)|
|S(Di, w)
∪
S(Dj , w)|
(1)
where S(Di, w) creates the shingles of length w for the document Di.
Definition 1. The Node Signature function is defined to be a Multi-Set of all
partial paths belonging to the sub-branch of the node.
The partial paths start from the current node rather than from the root of the
tree, but still goes through all the nodes of the subtree which has the current
element as root like it was in the original approach. However, partial paths
obtained from fields classified as Cosmetics are excluded from this Multi-Set.
The structure used is a Multi-Set rather than a Set in order to store the quantity
of occurrences for specific nodes in the sub-branch. For instance, the number of
spaces after a specific field can determinate a signature in an implementation.
Siblings nodes in a Sequence items are fixed and representative. Sibling nodes
in a Repetition can be made representative creating the partial paths of the
Multi-Set and using the respective position of a child.
Table 3.2 shows the Node Signature obtained from the node Header at the
tree of Fig. 3 (d).
Definition 2. The Ressemblance function used to measure the degree of sim-
ilarity between two nodes is based on the (1). The S(Ni, w) function applies the
Node Signature function over the node Ni.
Using w = 1 allows to compare the number of items these nodes have in
common though ignoring their position for a repetition.
Partial Paths Occurrences
Header.0.’Reply’ 1
Header.0.’Reply’.’Reply’ 1
Header.1.? 2
Header.1.?.SP 2
Header.1.?.SP.%x20 2
Header.1.?.SP.%x20.’ ’ 2
Header.2.Method.? 4
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA. 4
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA.%x41-5A 4
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA.%x41-5A.’U’ 1
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA.%x41-5A.’S’ 1
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA.%x41-5A.’E’ 1
Header.2.Method.?.ALPHA.%x41-5A.’R’ 1
(strikethrough) Strikethrough paths are the ones considered as cosmetics.
(?) Quotes define that the current path may be any of the repetition items.
Table 1. Partial paths obtained from Fig.3 (d)
Algorithm 1 Node differences Location
procedure NODEDIFF(nodea, nodeb)
if Tag(nodea) = Tag(nodeb) then
if Type(nodea) = TERMINAL then
if V alue(nodea) ! = V alue(nodeb) then
Report Difference(′V alue′, nodea, nodeb)
end if
else if Type(nodea) = NON − TERMINAL then
NODEDIFF (nodea.child0, nodeb.child0)) .Non Terminals have
.an unique child
else if Type(nodea) = SEQUENCE then
for i = 1..#nodea do .In a Sequence
NODEDIFF (nodea.childi, nodeb.childi) .#nodea = #nodeb
end for
else if Type(nodea) = REPETITION then
if not (#nodea = #nodeb) then
Report Difference(′Length′, nodea, nodeb)
end if
matches := Identify Children Matches(nodea, nodeb)
if ∃ (i, j) ∈ matches : i ! = j then
Report Difference(′Order′, nodea, nodeb)
end if
forall (i, j) ∈ matches do
NODEDIFF (nodea.childi, nodeb.childj)
end for
end if
else
Report Difference(′Choice′, nodea, nodeb)
end if
end procedure
3.3 Structural Difference Identification
Algorithm 1 is used to identify differences between two nodes which share the
same ancestor path in the two trees,
where the functions Tag, Value, Type return the name, value and respec-
tively the type of the current node. Note that Tag(nodea) = Tag(nodeb) ⇒
Type(nodea) = Type(nodeb).
The function Report Difference takes the type of difference to report and
the corresponding two nodes. Each time the function is called, it creates one
structure that stores the type of difference, the partial path from the root of the
tree to the current nodes (which is the same for both nodes) and a corresponding
value. For differences of type ’Value’ it will store the two terminal values, for
’Choice’ the two different Tags names, for ’Length’ the two lengths and for
’Order’ the matches.
The function Identify Children Matches identifies a match between chil-
dren of different repetition nodes. The similitude between each child from nodea
and nodeb (with n and m children respectively) is represented as a matrix, M,
of size n x m where:
Mi,j = resemblance(nodea.childi, nodeb.childj)
To find the most adequate match, a greedy matching assignment based on
the concept of Nash Equilibrium [5] is used. Children with the biggest similarity
are bound. If a child from nodea shares the same similarity score with more
than one child from nodeb, some considerations have to be added respecting
their position in the repetitions.
Figure 4 illustrates an example match, assuming that the following matrix
was obtained using the Resemblance method with the path “Message.2.?”. The
rows in the matrix represent the children from the subtree in (a) and the columns
the children from subtree (b).
M =
 .00 .00 .00.33 .00 .00
.00 .61 .90

All the compared children share some common items besides the choice nodes
(colored). Those common items are Cosmetics nodes, which are required in the
message in order to be compliant with the grammar. Note that, besides the
Cosmetic fields, the first item of the subtree (a) does not share any similarity
with any of the other nodes. It should therefore not match any other node.
4 Structural Features Extraction
4.1 Fields Classification
One major activity that was not yet described is how non-invariant fields are
identified. The process is done by using all the messages coming from one device
Fig. 4. Performed match between sub-branches of the tree
and finding the differences between each two messages using Algorithm 1. For
each result, a secondary algorithm (Algorithm 2) is run in order to fine tune the
extracted classification.
Algorithm 2 Fields Classification Algorithm
procedure FieldClassification(differencesa,b)
forall diff ∈ differencesa,b do
if diff.type ==′ V alue′) then
Classify as Dynamic(′V alue′, diff.path)
else if diff.type ==′ Choice′ then
Classify as Dynamic(′Choice′, diff.path)
else if diff.type ==′ Length′ then
Classify as Dynamic(′Length′, diff.path)
else if diff.type ==′ Order′ then
if not (∀ (i, j), (x, z) ∈ diff.matches :
(i < x ∧ j < z) ∨ (i > x ∧ j > z)) then
.Check if a permutation exists between the matched items.
Classify as Dynamic(′Order′, diff.path)
end if
end if
end for
end procedure
The Classify as Dynamic functions store in the global list, fieldClassi-
fications, a tuple with the type of the found difference (e.g. ’Value’, ’Choice’,
’Length’ or ’Order’) and the partial path in the tree structure that represents
the node in the message.
This algorithm recognizes only the fields that are Dynamic. The set of Static
fields will be represented by the union of all the fields not recognized as Dynamic.
Assuming a training set Msg set, of messages compliant with the grammar
as
Msg =
∪n
i=0 msg seti
where n is quantity of devices and msg seti is the set of messages generated by
device i, the total number of comparisons computed in this process is
cmps1 =
n∑
i=0
|msg seti| ∗ (|msg seti| − 1)
2
(2)
4.2 Features Recognition
Some features are essential for an inter-device classification. In contrast to the
Fields Classification, this process compares all the messages from the training
set sourced from different devices. All the Invariant Fields -for which different
implementations have different values- are identified. Algorithm 3 recognizes
these features. Its inputs are the fieldClassifications computed by the Algorithm
2, the Devices Identifier to which the compared message belongs as well as the
set of differences found by Algorithm 1 between the messages.
Algorithm 3 Features Recognition Algorithm
procedure featuresRecognition(fieldClassifications, DevIDa,b, differencesa,b)
forall diff ∈ differencesa,b do
if not (diff.type, diff.path) ∈ fieldClassifications then
if diff.type == ′V alue′ then
addFeature(′V alue′, diff.path, DevIDa,b, diff.valuea,b)
else if diff.type == ′Choice′ then
addFeature(′Choice′, diff.path, DevIDa,b, diff.namea,b)
else if diff.type == ′Length′ then
addFeature(′Length′, diff.path, DevIDa,b, diff.lengtha,b)
else if diff.type == ′Order′ then
if (∃ (x, z) ∈ diff.matches : x 6= z) then
addFeature(′Order′, diff.path, DevIDa,b,
diff.match, diff.children nodesa,b)
end if
end if
end if
end for
end procedure
The add Feature function stores in a global variable, recognizedFeatures,
the partial path of the node associated with the type of difference (i.e. Value,
Name, Order or Length) and a list of devices with their encountered value.
However, the ’Order’ feature presents a more complex approach, requiring minor
improvements.
Assuming the earlier Msg set set, this process will do the following number
of comparisons:
cmps2 =
n∑
i=0
|msg seti| ∗
n∑
j=i+1
|msg setj | (3)
From the recognizedFeatures only the Static fields are used. The recognized
features define a sequence of items, where each one represents the field location
path in the tree representation and a list of Device ID with their associated
value.
The Recognized Features can be classified in:
– Features that were found with each device and at least two distinct values
are observed for a pair of devices,
– Features that were found in some of the devices for which such a location
path does not exists in messages from other implementations.
4.3 Fingerprinting
The classification of a message uses the tree structure representation introduced
in section 3.1. The set of recognized features obtained in section 4 represents all
the partial paths in a tree structure that are used for the classification process.
In some cases, the features are of type ’Value’, ’Choice’ or ’Length’. Their
corresponding value is easily obtained. However, the case of an ’Order’ represents
a more complex approach, requiring some minor improvements
Figure 5 illustrates some identified features for an incoming message.
Fig. 5. Features Identification
Once a set of distinctive features is obtained, some well known classification
techniques can be leveraged to implement a classifier. In our work, we have
leveraged the machine learning technique described in [6].
5 Experimental Results
We have implemented the Fingerprinting Framework approach in Python. A
scannerless Generalized Left-to-right Rightmost (GLR) derivation parser has
been used (Dparser[7]) in order to solve ambiguities in the definition of the
grammar. The training function could easily be parallelized.
We have instantiated the fingerprinting approach on the SIP protocol. The
SIP messages are sent in clear text (ASCII) and their structure is inspired from
HTTP. Several primitives - REGISTER, INVITE, CANCEL, BYE and OP-
TIONS - allow session management for a voice/multimedia call. Some additional
extensions do also exist -INFO, NOTIFY, REFER, PRACK- which allow the
support of presence management, customization, vendor extensions etc.
We have captured 21827 SIP messages from a real network, summarized in
Table 2.
Device Software/Firmware version
Asterisk v1.4.4
Cisco CallManager v5.1.1
Cisco 7940/7960
vP0S3-08-7-00
vP0S3-08-8-00
Grandstream Budge Tone-200 v1.1.1.14
Linksys SPA941 v5.1.5
Thomson ST2030 v1.52.1
Thomson ST2020 v2.0.4.22
SJPhone
v1.60.289
v1.60.320
v1.65
Twinkle
v0.8.1
v0.9
Snom v5.3
Kapanga v0.98
X-Lite v3.0
Kphone v4.2
3CX v1.0
Express Talk v2.02
Linphone v1.5.0
Ekiga v2.0.3
Table 2. Tested equipment
The system was trained with only 12% of the 21827 messages. These messages
were randomly sampled. However, a proportion between the number of collected
messages and the number used for the training was kept; they ranged from 50 to
350 messages per device. Table 3 shows the average and total time obtained for
the comparisons of each training phase and for the message classification process
(i.e. message fingerprinting). During both Phase 1 and 2, the comparisons were
distributed over 10 computers ranging from Pentium IV to Core Duo. As it was
expected, the average comparison time per message in Phase 2 was lower than
in the previous phase, since only the invariant fields are compared. To evaluate
the training, the system classified all the sampled messages (i.e. 21927 messages)
in only in one computer (Core Duo @ 2.93GHz).
Type of Action Average time Number of actions Total computed
per action computed time
Msg. comparisons 632 milisec 296616 5 hours(1)
for Phase 1
Msg. comparisons 592 milisec 3425740 56 hours(1)
for Phase 2
Msg. classification 100 milisec. 21827 40 minutes
(1) Computed time using 10 computers.
Table 3. Performance results obtained with the system
172 features were discovered among all the different types of messages. These
features represent items order, different lengths and values of fields where non
protocol knowledge except its syntax grammar had been used. Between two dif-
ferent devices the distance of different features ranges between 26 to 95 features,
where most of the lower values correspond to different versions of the same
device. Usually, up to 46 features are identified in one message.
Table 4 summarizes the sensitivity, specificity and accuracy. The results were
obtained using the test data set.
Classification
True Positive False Positive Positive Predictive
Value
18881 20 0.998
False Negative True Negative Negative Predictive
Value
2909 N.A. 0.993
Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy
0.866 0.999 0.993
Table 4. Accuracy results obtained with the system
In this table we can observe that the results are very encouraging due to the
high specificity and accuracy. However, some observations can be made about
the quantity of false negatives. About 2/5 of them belong to only one imple-
mentation (percentage that represents 50% of its messages), 2/5 belongs to 3
more device classes (representing 18% of their messages), the final 1/5 belongs
to 8 classes (representing 10% of their messages) and the 7 classes left do not
have false negatives. This issue can be a consequence of the irregularity in the
quantity from the set of messages in each device. Three of the higher mentioned
classes had been used in our test-bed to acquire most features of SIP. A second
explanation can be that in fact many of those messages do not contain valuable
information (e.g. intermediary messages). Table 5 shows all the 38 types of mes-
sages collected in our test with information concerning their miss-classification
(i.e. False Negatives).
Finally, we created a set of messages which have been manually modified.
These modifications include changing the User-Agent, Server-Agent and refer-
ences to device name. As a result, deleting a few such fields did not influence
Type of Message False Negatives Message quantity Miss percentage
200, 100, ACK 1613 9358 17%
(710, 561, 347) (4663, 1802, 2893) (15%, 31%, 11%)
501, 180, 101 824 3414 24%
BYE, 486 „
257, 215, 148
104, 100
« „
385, 1841, 148
892, 176
« „
65%, 11%, 100%
11%, 67%
«
489, 487, 603 213 636 33%
202, 480, 481 0
@
84, 57, 28
21, 13, 6
2, 1, 1
1
A
0
@
84, 230, 118
52, 42, 18
2, 38, 51
1
A
0
@
100%, 24%, 23%
40%, 30%, 33%
100%, 2%, 2%
1
A
380, 415, 400
INVITE, OPTIONS 117 5694 2%
REGISTER, CANCEL 0
@
38, 34
25, 19
1
1
A
0
@
3037, 628
1323, 297
409
1
A
0
@
1%, 5%
1%, 6%
.00%
1
A
SUBSCRIBE
INFO, REFER 0 2223 0%
PRACK, NOTIFY 0
@
1830, 163
117, 77
36
1
A
PUBLISH
11 other 0 492 0%
Response Codes
Table 5. False Negative classification details
the decision of the system; neither did it changing their banners to another im-
plementation name. However, as more modifications were done, less precise the
system became and more mistakes were done.
6 Related Work
Fingerprinting became a popular topic in the last few years. It started with the
pioneering work of Comer and Lin [8] and is currently an essential activity in
security assessment tasks. Some of the most known network fingerprinting oper-
ations are done by NMAP [9], using a set of rules and active probing techniques.
Passive techniques became known mostly with the P0F [10] tool, which is capa-
ble to do OS fingerprinting without requiring active probes. Many other tools
like (AMAP, XProbe, Queso) did implement similar schemes.
Application layer fingerprinting techniques, specifically for SIP, were first
described in [11, 12]. These approaches proposed active as well as passive finger-
printing techniques. Their common baseline is the lack of an automated approach
for building the fingerprints and constructing the classification process. Further-
more, the number of signatures described are minimal which leaves the systems
easily exposed to approaches as the one described by D. Watson et al. [13], that
can fool them by obfuscation of such observable signatures. Recently, the work
by J. Caballero et al. [6] described a novel approach for the automation of Active
Fingerprint generation which resulted in a vast set of possible signatures. It is one
of the few automatic approaches found in the literature and it is based in finding
a set of queries (automatically generated) that identify different responses in the
different implementations. While our work addresses specifically the automation
for passive fingerprinting, we can imagine this two complementary approaches
working together.
There have been recently similar efforts done in the research community
aiming however at a very different goal from ours. These activities started with
practical reverse engineering of proprietary protocols [14] and [15] and a simple
application of bioinformatics inspired techniques to protocol analysis [16]. These
initial ideas matured and several other authors reported good results of sequence
alignment techniques in [17], [18], [19] and [20]. Another major approach for the
identification of the structure in protocol messages is to monitor the execution
of an endpoint and identify the relevant fields using some tainted data [21], [22].
Recently, work on identifying properties of encrypted traffic has been reported
in [23, 24]. These two approaches used probabilistic techniques based on packet
arrivals, interval, packet length and randomness in the encrypted bits to identify
Skype traffic or the language of conversation. While all these complementary
works addressed the identification of the protocol building blocks or properties
in their packets, we assumed a known protocol and worked on identifying specific
implementation stacks.
The closest approach to ours, in terms of message comparison, it is the work
developed by M. Chang and C. K.Poon [25] for collection training SPAM de-
tectors. However, in their approach as they focus in identifying human written
sentences, they only consider the lexical analysis of the messages and do not
exploit an underlying structure.
Finally, two other solutions have been proposed in the literature in this re-
search landscape. Flow based identification has been reported in [26], while a
grammar/probabilistic based approach is proposed in [27] and respectively in
[28].
7 Conclusions
In this article we described a novel approach for generating fingerprinting sys-
tems based on the structural analysis of protocol messages. Our solution auto-
mates the generation by using both formal grammars and collected traffic traces.
It detects important and relevant complex tree like structures and leverages them
for building fingerprints. The applicability of our solution lies in the field of in-
trusion detection and security assessment, where precise device/service/stack
identification are essential. We have implemented a SIP specific fingerprinting
system and evaluated its performance. The obtained results are very encourag-
ing. Future work will consist in improving the method and applying it to other
protocols and services. Our work is relevant to the tasks of identifying the pre-
cise vendor/device that has generated a captured trace. We do not address the
reverse engineering of unknown protocols, but consider that we know the un-
derlying protocol. The current approach does not cope with cryptographically
protected traffic. A straightforward extension for this purpose is to assume that
access to the original traffic is possible. Our main contribution consists in a novel
solution to automatically discover the significant differences in the structure of
protocol compliant messages. We will extend our work towards the natural evo-
lution, where the underlying grammar is unknown.
The key idea is to use a structural approach, where formal grammars and
collected network traffic are used. Features are identified by paths and their
associated values in the parse tree. The obtained results of our approach are very
good. This is due to the fact that a structural message analysis is performed.
Most existing fingerprinting systems are built manually and require a long lasting
development process.
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